Duyurular
Turkish Competition Authority Publishes Guidelines on Competition Violations in Labor Markets
The Guidelines on Competition Violations in Labor Markets ("Guidelines") have been published by the Turkish Competition Authority ("Authority") on the Authority's official website on 03/12/2024.
According to the Guidelines;
- The purpose of the Guidelines is stated as setting out the fundamental principles for evaluating the impact of behaviors on labor markets in the context of detecting and monitoring practices that hinder, distort, or restrict competition in a manner affecting goods and services markets within the borders of the Republic of Türkiye.
- Article 4 of the Act prohibits agreements and concerted practices between undertakings, and decisions and practices of associations of undertakings which have their object or effect or likely effect the prevention, distortion or restriction of competition directly or indirectly in a particular market for goods or services.
- Labor as an input for the provision of goods and services constitutes one of the parameters of competition. Undertakings seeking to access the most qualified labor at the lowest cost may exhibit tendencies to retain their employees or suppress wages. Consequently, undertakings competing for labor may engage in anti-competitive agreements that restrict employee mobility or determine wages and other working conditions.
- Agreements or concerted practices between employers, as well as decisions and practices of associations of undertakings that have the object or effect of fixing employees' wages and other working conditions, are considered a violation of Article 4 of the Act.
- The most common types of agreements that restrict competition between undertakings in labor markets are wage-fixing agreements and non-hiring agreements.
- Wage-fixing agreements are agreements where undertakings jointly determine working conditions such as wages, wage increases, work periods, fringe benefits, compensation, leave entitlements, and non-compete obligations. These agreements aim to set working conditions, particularly at a certain level or within a specific range.
- The Competition Board ("Board") evaluates such agreements within the framework of price-fixing agreements that arise on the output side of the market, and wage-fixing agreements are considered cartels.
- Undertakings may make wage-fixing agreements either directly or through a third party. If a third party mediates or facilitates the agreement, the third party may be considered a party to the infringement, depending on the characteristics of the specific case.
- No-poaching agreements are those that are made directly or indirectly, where one undertaking will not to offer a job to or hire the employees of another undertaking.
- Non-poaching agreements are assessed within the same framework as supplier/customer allocation agreements and are considered as cartels.
- Non-poaching agreements may be made by undertakings either directly or through a third party. If a third party mediates or facilitates the agreement, the third party may be considered a party to the infringement, depending on the specifics of the case.
- Exchange of Information refers to any data directly or indirectly related to labor, while information sharing refers to the exchange of such data types between undertakings.
- Information exchange can be unilateral or multilateral and can take place either directly or through a third-party medium, such as intermediaries or platforms.
- Competitively sensitive information in labor markets that may produce such results are information on wages or information on other working conditions with an obvious effect on employees’ choice of employment or labor mobility in general.
- Information exchange is not only considered between competing undertakings in the labor market but is also acknowledged to take place through third parties such as independent market research organizations and private employment agencies.
- It will be accepted that the exchange of information, which fulfills all of the conditions below, will not create anticompetitive effects as a rule
- should be managed by a third party,
- does not permit the identification of the data source or individual data content,
- the information which is the subject of the exchange should be at least three months old,
- information should include at least the data of ten participants
- no single participant’s data should have a share more than 25% of the total data.
You can access the full text of the announcement published by the Board here.
You can access the full text of the Guidelines here.
Kind regards,
Zumbul Attorneys-at-Law